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NATURAL LAW IN THE MODERN
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONS
Gottfried Dietze
THE SECOND WORLD WAR has brought about one of the most fundamental
revolutions in modem European history. Unlike its predecessors of 1640,
1789, and 1917, the revolution of 1945 was not confined to one country.
Its ideas did not gradually find their way into the well-established and stable
orders of other societies. It was a spontaneous movement in the greater part
of a continent that had traditionally been torn by dissension; and its impact
was immediately felt by a society which was in a state of dissolution and
despair. The revolution of 1945 had a truly European character.
There was no uprising of a lower nobility as in 1640; of a third estate as
in the French Revolution; of the proletariat as in Russia. Since fascism had
derived support from all social strata and preached the solidarity of all citizens
of the nation, there could hardly be room for a class struggle. Finally, this
was not a revolution against some ancien rigime. The fascist governments
denounced the past and claimed to be revolutionary. Of recent origin, they
received their authority from the very people who were now denouncing them.
Those who survived the war could hardly blame their forefathers for their
misery. A strange revolution indeed: there was no former generation or
class to blame. Here was a refutation of the consequences of one's own negli-
gence or intent, an agonizing appraisal of one's own guilt. The liberation
from fascism did not free the individual from his bad conscience, nor did
the classic thought that democracy inevitably leads to dictatorslbip comfort
the men of 1945.
No wonder this revolution was bare of enthusiasm. No better future was
in sight. The millennia of the Imperium Romanum, the Tausendjdhrige
Reich, the Ordre Nouveau had failed to arrive. Nobody dared suggest a
new millennium, even of the democratic brand.' All knew that democracy
1. For the political crises that confronted constitutional democracies before the rise of
authoritarianism, see, for Italy: Luox ViLUAm, THE AWAKENING OF ITALY 1-207 (1924);
C. SFORZA, MAKERS OF MODERN EUROPE 319 ff (1928). For the Weimar Republic: C. B.
HoovzR, GERMANY ENTERS THE THIRD REICH 32-95 (1933); R. T. CxAK, THE FALL OF
THE GERMAN REPUBLIC (1935); E. A. MowRER, GERMANY PUTS THE CLOCK BACK
(1939); WILLIBALT APELT, GESCHICHTE DER WEIMARER VERFASSUNG (1946); FERDINAND
FRIEDENSBURO, DIE WEIMAR REPUBLIK (1946). For the Third Republic: ROGER PINTO,
kLiMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 269-99 (1948); PAUL FARMER, VICHY, POLITICAL
DILEMMA (1955).
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had paved the way for dictatorship only a few years before. Mussolini, Hitler,
and P6tain attained power legally under democratic constitutions. 2 Besides,
by the end of the war the meaning of democracy had become more and more
confused. Not only had Goebbels called the Hitler regime a democracy, but
the Communists also set up "peoples' democracies" in Eastern Europe, main-
taining that their forms of government were more democratic than those of
the West. The question of legitimacy was raised. The risistance was generally
accepted as a justified illegality against some fraudulent legality. But was
democracy the panacea? Before the advent of fascism, most people agreed
that legitimacy could only be derived from the people as the suprema potestas.
The principle vox populi vox dei was not subject to much criticism. But
had this deistic concept not resulted in a positivism which not only made
dictatorship possible, but also served as a most powerful weapon in the hands
of authoritarian rulers? In 1945 skepticism about democracy ran as high as
hatred of dictatorship. A general apathy was the consequence. The fin de
sicle, predicted since the last century, seemed to have arrived. European
society looked like an old man who has come to realize the futility of a lifetime
and, full of disappointment, said "no" to everything. No fascism, no commu-
nism, no free enterprise, no planned economy were wanted. Friedrich could
very well speak of the "negative" revolution after the Second World War.3
Nevertheless, this negativism constituted something positive. No matter
how much apathy and skepticism existed in 1945, every revolution, as an
immediate reaction against something, has immediate ends and aims. The
"negative" revolution of 1945 was negative, indeed, insofar as it was mainly
a reaction against a juristic positivism which under the dictatorships had been
carried to extremes. Quite naturally, refuge was sought in natural law, which
2. Mussolini was asked by the king to form a new cabinet on Oct. 29, 1922, following the
failure of forxuer Prime Minister Salandra to form a cabinet. He was appointed Prime Min-
ister the next day. His first cabinet included members of all parties, except the Marxist
parties. On Nov. 18 Mussolini obtained a 306:116 vote of confidence in the Chamber, and
on Nov. 25 he was granted plenary powers by a vote of 275:90. Hitler was appointed
Chancellor on Jan. 30, 1933, by President Hindenburg. His first cabinet was a coali-
tion cabinet with the German Nationalists. The Enabling Act of March 24, 1933 (RGBI.
1,141) was passed by the Reichstag by a vote of 441:94, against the votes of the Social
Democrats. There were no votes from 81 communists and 26 socialists, for they were either
imprisoned or in hiding. In France, the act for calling the National Assembly for the pur-
pose of amending the constitution of the Third Republic was passed in the Senate by a vote
of 225.: 1, in the Chamber of Deputies by a vote of 385:3. The communists were barred
from voting. The National Assembly convened on July 10, 1940, and enacted a law giving
plenary powers to Pitain. Even if one counts against this act the votes of the communists,
who were not present, it would have passed with a comfortable majority. The vote was
569:80. No party voted en bloc against the act.
3. Carl J. Friedrich, The Political Theory of the New Democratic Constitutions, 12 Rz-
vmw oi Poarrcs 215 ff. (1950).
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promised to assure the restoration of the dignity of man in a political society.
Consequently, people returned to the principles of 1640 and 1789. In spite of
the apparent weakness inherent in democracy, the Third and Weimar Repub-
lics appeared as a golden age when compared with the Fascist state, the Third
Reich, and the Vichy rtgime. Of all governments, democracy was still
believed to be the one that was most likely to guarantee the individual's
freedom and happiness. The citizens of a society seemed to be the best
guardians of their rights.
However, the period after the war was also characterized by a rejection
of the merely reasonable and by a resurgence of faith. The rationalist parties
which had their ideological roots in the age of reason, like the Liberals and
Social-Democrats in Germany, the Radical-Socialists and Socialists in France,
and their Italian counterparts, were on the decline. On the other hand,
Christian-Democratic parties became more influential. The brotherhood of
those who believed in utilitarianism and economic determinism was being
replaced by a community of Christians. The term "internationalism" was
avoided and the idea of a common culture emphasized. This replacement of
the consciousness of a common economic interest by that of a common cultural
heritage led to a revival of the European idea.
This was, then, the dualism of the postwar revolution: the break with
a positivism that had reached extremes under the dictatorships was accom-
plished through a revival of natural law in its most comprehensive sense. While
the natural law concept of the 17th and 18th centuries was accepted by many,
it was rejected-as an outgrowth of mediaeval nominalism and a stepping
stone to 19th century historicism and positivism -hich in turn paved the way
for the barbarism of our century-by those who believed in faith rather than
man's reason. They were theists rather than deists and wanted to revive the
natural law of the Middle Ages. Seeing nothing in the rights of man of 1789
but a product of a rationalism that had become more and more atheistic and
that considered human reason as the source of all revelation, they believed in
a natural law which was derived from the order created by God, in which
man's nature was the source of, and his reason nothing but a means to, revela-
tion. Natural law was not just some product of human reason, but a system
of norms which through reason could be found in the order erected by God,
in which God was both principium and finis. They believed in a law which
was not quod apud omnes gentes observatur-law that is valid with all peoples
as positive law-but a law which Plato had referred to as the law in itself,
v,o. Kr9 ,P C r Ov ToZ v 5 Ov. Cicero had said of it that it was the same
in Rome and Athens, unchangeable and eternal at all times and for all peoples,
the voice of God himself, which could not be abolished; nor could its validity
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be contested by the resolution of a senate or a plebiscite. 4
With the resurgence of natural law came a desire for weak government
as a guarantee of the existence of natural rights. This is not surprising.
Natural law had not only been cast aside by the positivists,5 but through
the concentration of power in the hands of the dictators, it had also become
either totally banned or twisted beyond recognition. 6  The quaestio iuris iuris
had been answered by the positivists with the formula "law is law."'7 Some
jurists even precluded that question by identifying law and state.8 Under these
doctrines the dictators were able to consider all their actions as right and just.
This led to a denial oi individual rights and, considering the omnipotence of
the dictator, to an absence of constitutionalism.9
II
NATURAL LAW thus played a decisive role in the quest for constitutionalism.
It found expression in the wave of constitution-making which swept the
Continent after 1945, and which in its extent can be compared to similar
tendencies after the Declaration of Independence, the French Revolution, and
the liberation of the South American colonies. Constitution-makers even went
4. De Republica, 1II, 22.
5. Very typical is Windscheid in his Greifswald university address of 1854: "The dream of
natural law is over, and the titanic attempts of the newer philosophy were not able to storm
into heaven." Karl Bergbohm, in his JURISPRUDENZ UND RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (1892), set
out "to eradicate the weed natural law stock and barrel." In spite of its rejection of natural
law, Bergbohm's book offers an excellent survey of the history of natural law. But already
Kohler could state in his RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE at 53 (2d ed. 1917) that contrary to his
intention, Bergbohm demonstrates the untenability of positivism.
6. Thus the nazi government maintained that the concentration camps served humanity
because they separated the bad citizens from the good and valuable members of society.
Euthanasia and compulsory sterilization were justified in the interest of a higher humanity
which prescribed the elimination of "ballast" for the sake of the present and future genera-
tions. Christian concepts were blamed for maintaining misery. Ironically enough, there was
written above the gate to Buchenwald concentration camp, "To Each His Own" (Jedem
das Seine).
7. This formula precludes the possibility of judging a law by the postulates of other norms.
From a non-positivist point of view, the principle "Gesetz ist Gesetz" must appear as unten-
able as the principle "Mark ist Mark," which was announced by German jurists after the
First World War, in view of the fact that the inflation had reduced the original value of the
mark to about one millionth.
8. Especially HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 117 ff. (1934). The identification of
law and state means to Kelsen that the state can do no wrong: "A wrong of the state must
under all circumstances be a contradiction in terms." HAUPTPROBLEME DER STAATSRECHTS-
LEHRE 249 (1923). See also id. at 248, 449; ALLEGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 107-110 (1925).
9. Already the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 recognized the protection of the
individual's rights and the separation of powers as premises for constitutionalism: "Toute
sociti dans laquelle la garantie des droits n'est pas assurie, ni la siparation des pouvoirs
diterminie, n'a point de Constitution" (art. 16).
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so far as to transmute the right of revolution into constitutional norms,'0
something which so far had been considered a contradiction in terms. Natural
law found expression in the French Constitution of 1946, the Italian Constitu-
tion of 1947, and the German Basic Law of 1949. But whereas the former
are content with an assertion of historical natural law, there break through,
in the Bonn constitution, strong elements of the Aristotelian-Scholastic concept
of natural law.
As could be expected from a movement that was a reaction against one
common foe, namely, fascist authoritarianism, all three constitutions embody
certain common ideals. They assert a belief in the brotherhood of man.11
The French preamble "solemnly reaffirms the rights and liberties of man and
of the citizen consecrated by the Declaration of Rights of 1789." Italy affirms
the rights of Mazzini's good citizen.' 2 Germany protects the dignity of man
(Art. 1), abolishes capital punishment (Art. 102) and compulsory military
service (Art. 4). Finally, all three constitutions set up a form of government
which under the doctrines of the age of reason seemed most likely to effectuate
the individual's happiness, namely, democracy.
The importance attributed by the constitution-maker to the principles of
natural law can be seen from the fact that the transmutations of some of those
principles into positive law are made immune from legal change. The French
and Italian constitutions provide that the republican form of government
may not be the subject of an amendment to the constitution (Art. 95, 139
respectively). The Basic Law prohibits amendments "by which the organi-
zation of the federation into states, the basic co-operation of the states in legis-
lation or the basic principles laid down in articles 1 and 20 are affected"
(Art. 79). The German constitution thus goes beyond its French and Italian
counterparts. Not only is the democratic form of government permanently
secured, but also the individual's fundamental rights and the separation of
powers and federalism-two means for the protection of those rights.
This distinction is fundamental. In France and Italy, the democratic
pouvoir constituant protects itself through the perpetuation of democracy (or
republicanism). In Bonn, on the other hand, the democratic constitution-
maker, while making democracy immune from the amending process, also
protects the individual and thus guarantees his freedom from democracy. Since
under all three constitutions the amending power is vested in the legislature,
10. Constitution of Hesse of 1946, art. 147; constitution of Brandenburg of 1947, art. 5;
constitution of Bremen of 1947, art. 19.
11. See, for FranceA preamble; Italy, art. 11; Germany, preamble and art. I and 2.
12. Statement of Ruini, rapporteur of the Commission for the Constitution. Progretto di
Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana, Relazione del Presidente della Commissione, 1947
TnPooRAFA DELLA CAMERA DEi DEPUTI 4, col. 1 (Rome).
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this most democratic branch of government is more likely to infringe upon
the rights of the individual through an amendment under the French and
Italian constitutions than under the Basic Law.
Similarly, the legislatures in France and Italy may restrict those rights
according to the express provisions of the constitution. The preamble of the
French constitution protects the rights of 1789 only to the degree that they
are "recognized by the laws of the Republic." In Italy, the scope of the
individual's- rights-highsoundingly proclaimed in- the text of the constitution
-is left to the discretionary definition of the legislator.
Under the French and Italian constitutions, which start out from the
premise that the legislature as the reflection of the people's will can do no
wrong, the individual, of whom Rousseau once said that he is born free and
in chains everywhere, can actually be a slave and be put in chains by the
legislature. But under democracy, as envisaged by the Basic Law, man must
be free. The framers of the French and Italian constitutions, believing in
the infallibility of the volonte' g~nirale, accepted the emancipation of man
through popular government without qualifications. The constitutional
convention in West Germany was aware of the dangers inherent in democracy.
While regarding popular government as most conducive to the protection
of the individual, the delegates at Bonn were distrustful of the infallibility
of human reason and more cautious toward democracy. The French and
Italian constitutions consider the principles of historical natural law as sufficient
for the protection of man. The Basic Law maintains that these principles,
while cherished, might not suffice to guarantee the individual's rights. This
subtle difference is reflected in the preambles. The French constitution speaks
of the principles of 1789, the Italian of "fundamental principles" as they were
understood by Mazzini, namely, the principles of the Declaration of the
Rights of Man.13 The German people, on the other hand, enacted the Basic
Law "conscious of their responsibility before God and mankind." Not only
man's subjectively conceived natural law is being taken into consideration, but
God's own law, an objective, ever-present norm, the lex aeterna to which the
lex naturalis is subordinate. In the Basic Law, there is evident a belief in
the universale ante rem. The constitution, its institutions and those living
under it appear as universale in re, and not just as something independent
of a higher norm. 14
13. Ibid.
14. See HEiNRicH Kipp, NATURRECHT 140 OD KNER STAr 11-39 (1950),
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III
THIS INSERTION of natural law concepts in the Basic Law cannot primarily
be considered as a reaction against or an improvement of the constitutions
of France and Italy. Of course, it is apparent that these constitutions with
their stress upon democracy and legislative supremacy, were immediate
reactions against a regime considered brutal because of its denial of popular
participation in government, and the Basic Law, in turn, was a conservative
reaction against the democratic excesses of those constitutions. However, the
Basic Law can rather be considered as marking the conclusion of a develop-
ment that had been going on in the German states since the end of the war.
The Bonn constitution is a national mirror of the modern state constitutions,
reflecting their common features as well as their differences. 15
In all these constitutions, there is evident a resurgence of natural law-
and of its dualistic character. Whereas some states, mainly those of the Soviet
zone, were content with an assertion of the principles of the French Revolu-
tion, most West German constitutions also contain elements of the older
natural law.
Again, all constitutions, as a reaction against the Hitler rtgime, embody
certain common ideals. They proclaim the equality of man, the protection
of the individual's basic rights, and self-government. Also, most of these
constitutions protect these principles from the amending process. The consti-
tution of Saxony-Anhalt provides that "constitutional amendments shall not
infringe upon the democratic principles of the constitution and the republican-
parliamentary form of government" (Art. 58). The constitution of Branden-
burg contains a similar provision (Art. 35). Finally, that of Saxony prohibits
amendments that are incompatible with democracy and humanity (Art. 97).
A protection of the individual from democracy is indicated here. However,
since the concept of humanity is not defined, it appears doubtful whether the
individual could derive any rights from this provision. Like other Eastern
constitutions, that of Saxony seems to accept the Rousseauistic doctrine that
popular government is of necessity humane, and that a conflict between the
15. The following states (Linder) passed new constitutions in the years after the war:
Wfirttemberg-Baden (1946), Bavaria (1946), Hesse (1946), Thuringia (1946), Saxony-
Anhalt (1947), Brandenburg (1947), Mecklenburg (1947), Saxony (1947), Rhineland-
Palatinate (1947), Baden (1947), Wfirttemberg-Hohenzollern (1947), Bremen (1947). The
Basic Law was drafted in 1948.
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interests of the individual and society is not possible.16
The picture is different in West Germany. The constitution of Baden
prohibits an amendment of the "vital basic parts of a democratic constitution"
(Art. 92). At first glance, this seems nothing but a repetition of the Eastern
practice of making democracy immune. However, according to the preamble
the people of Baden, when making the constitution, acted as "trustee of the
old tradition of Baden." This tradition is that of a democratic Rechtsstaat,
in which the protection of the individual is considered the end of popular
government. Other West German constitutions do not deviate from this
principle and express it in even more unequivocal terms. The constitution of
Hesse, while exempting the democratic, republican-parliamentary form of gov-
ernment from the amending process, also prohibits the establishment of any
form of dictatorship (Art. 150). This includes the dictatorship of a demo-
cratic majority: Art. 26 says that the individual's basic rights are unchange-
able. The Bavarian constitution exempts the democratic principle from
amendment (Art. 75) and prohibits a restriction of the basic rights guaranteed
under the constitution (Art. 98). Wiirttemberg-Baden excludes amendments
which would be in contradiction to the spirit of the constitution, a spirit which
is quite similar to that of the constitution of Baden. 17 Rhineland-Palatinate,
while protecting the democratic form of government, expressly secures the
individual's liberty from the amending power (Art. 129 in connection with
the preamble; Art. 1 and 74). Finally, the constitution of Bremen, omitting
a reference to democracy, declares the immunity of the individual's basic
rights from the amending process (Art. 20).
Summarizing, we may say that the makers of the constitutions in the East
were content with putting the democratic form of government beyond the
jurisdiction of the amending power. Those in the West, while protecting
democracy, primarily gave consideration to the rights of the individual. This
difference is as fundamental as that observed between the French and Italian
constitutions and the Basic Law. In the Soviet zone the people, by precluding
an amendment of the democratic form of government, were merely perpetuat-
16. Compare, in this connection, article 99 of the constitution of Mecklenburg: "All efforts
to abolish or restrict the democratic form of government or the basic rights of the citizen
are unconstitutional. They are to be punished as a crime against the constitution.... De.
tails shall be regulated by law. Unconstitutional tendencies do not become legal through
the observance of the forms that are prescribed by this constitution." Here the question
arises whether the restriction extends to the amending power. The answer seems to be in
the negative because of the provision, "Details shall be regulated by law." (Argumentum
a maiori ad minus).
17. The partition of the German southwest into the states Wfirttemberg-Baden in the north
and Wfirttemberg-Hohenzollern and Baden in the south was due to the occupation of the
northern part by the United States, and of the southern part by France. The former states
of Baden and Wiirttemberg have a long democratic tradition.
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ing popular majority rule, or the republican-parliamentary form of govern-
ment. In the West the people, acting as a constituent group, while securing
their future participation in government, let it be known that democracy is
only a means for the good of the individual. Consequently, they protected
man as much from a despotism of the popular majority as from that of a
monarch or an aristocracy. The people were emancipating the individual
rather than themselves as a group. Since in the German state constitutions
the amending power is vested in the legislature,18 this branch of government
is, in respect to the restriction of basic rights through amendment, more
powerful in the East than in the West.
Similarly, those rights, while proclaimed in the Eastern constitutions, are
subjected to restrictions by the legislature, which is considered "the supreme
democratic organ of the state." 19  On the other hand, the West German
constitutions restrict the legislative body as much as they restrict the execu-
tive and judiciary. Under Art. 20 of the constitution of Bremen and Art.
26 of that of Hesse, the provisions guaranteeing private rights are directly
binding upon the legislature, the judges, and the administration. The consti-
tution of Rhineland-Palatinate binds the legislative, judicial, and executive
branches to protect the individual's basic rights, which are recognized as
being derived from natural law (Art. 1). Under the Eastern constitutions,
private rights appear as being subjectively perceived by the pouvoir constituant
and thus as being granted by the maker of the constitution. Their scope
can be perceived anew at any time by the amending power, and thus they
can become subject to restriction and abolition. Since the legislature is also
entitled to define the extent of the individual's private sphere, private rights
are as much by the grace, as they are at the mercy of, the legislator. Under
the Western constitutions, basic rights appear as an objective value. The
pouvoir constituant does not grant them, but merely guarantees them. Having
their roots in a natural law that is not so much the creation of human reason
but of God, these rights are immune from a subjectivist interpretation and
can be neither amended nor abolished. In the East, the legislature is credited
with infallibility, which, somewhat in a mystical way, like the volonti ginirale,
cannot err; but in the West it is reduced to Rousseau's will of all, a sum of
18. Wfirttemberg-Baden, art. 85; Bavaria, art. 75; Hesse, art. 123; Bremen, art. 125;
Rhineland-Palatinate, art. 129; Baden, art. 92; Wfirttemberg-Hohenzollern, art. 71; Thur-
ingia, art. 39; Saxony-Anhalt, art. 58; Brandenburg, art. 35; Mecklenburg, art. 60; Saxony,
art. 96. In the states of East Germany and Rhineland-Palatinate, the constitution may also
be amended by referendum. The constitutions of Bavaria, Hesse, and Baden prescribe a
compulsory referendum upon an amendment proposed by the legislature. The other consti-
tutions provide for the possibility of a referendum.
19. Thuringia, art. 8; Saxony-Anhalt, art. 24; Brandenburg, art. 9; Mecklenburg, art. 22;
Saxony, art. 26.
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particular wills that may be deceived and so will wrongly. In the East, the
makers of the constitutions fulfilled a constitutive act when adopting private
rights; but in the West they were, when transmuting natural law into positive
norms, only fulfilling a declaratory function.
The belief in the natural law of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition finds
expression in different provisions of the West German constitutions. Whereas
the people in the East stressed solely such concepts as liberty, equality, fra-
ternity, those in the West emphasized also the r6le of God, morals and the
family, often connecting these values with those of Christianity.
The constitutions of East Germany do not make references to God, not
even in the provisions which guarantee freedom of religion. The Western
constitutions often contain an invocatio dei in the preamble. The Bavarians
reject a "state and social order without God." The people of Baden and
Wirttemberg-Baden enacted their constitutions full of "confidence in God."
The constitution of Wiirttemberg-Hohenzollem was framed "in obedience
toward God and with confidence in God, the only just judge." The people
of Rhineland-Palatinate, "conscious of their responsibility toward God,"
consider God "the source of all justice and the creator of all human society."
Whereas the Eastern constitutions refrain from mentioning morals and
ethics as binding the human lawmaker, some constitutions in the West make
explicit reference to morals and ethics. Art. I of the constitution of Rhineland-
Palatinate recognizes a "natural code of morals" and "natural justice"; Art. 1
of Wiirttemberg-Baden an "eternal code of morals"; Art. 4 of Wiirttemberg-
Hohenzollern shows a belief in the "moral community of men."
Aside from such a general recognition of morals and ethics, many constitu-
tions reveal an influence of natural law upon the organization of human life
in such fundamental institutions as marriage, the family, and education. Mar-
riage and the family are called "the natural foundation of human society,"
"communities with their own natural right" (Rhineland-Palatinate, Art. 23).
Art. 124 of the Bavarian constitution sees in marriage and the family the
"natural and moral foundation of the human community," Art. 101 of the
constitution of Wiirttemberg-Hohenzollern "the most important foundation
of a moral and orderly community life."
According to Art. 25 of the constitution of Rhineland-Palatinate, which
is similar to Art. 126 of the Bavarian constitution, the parents have "the
natural right and the supreme duty to bring up their children to a state of
physical, moral and social fitness." This right forms, according to the con-
stitutions of Rhineland-Palatinate (Art. 27) and Northrhine-Westphalia (Art.
8) the foundation for the organization of the school system. Under Art. 114
of the constitution of Wiirttemberg-Hohenzollern the will of the parents is
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decisive for the type of school which their children attend, and in Bavaria all
educational matters are to be decided by the parents (Art. 25). The parents
also determine whether their children should participate in the religious
instruction offered in the public schools.20
Concluding our inquiry into the natural law content of the German state
constitutions since 1945, we may say that the constitutions in West Germany,
while sharing with those in the East many of the natural law concepts of
the age of reason, contain strong elements of philosophical natural law. It is
true that not all West German constitutions are equally enthusiastic about
the older natural law. One discovers that different concepts of natural law
exist not only between East and West Germany, but also within West Ger-
many. The final result of West German postwar constitutional development
-the Basic Law-reflects this division. The Parliamentary Council in Bonn
was by no means unanimously in favor of an invocatio dei, or for that matter,
an acceptance of natural law as some absolute norm.21 Many of the dele-
gates wanted merely to go back to the principles of Weimar and the "historical
concept of natural law," upon which these principles had been based.22 On
the other hand, there existed a strong tendency toward the rejection of his-
torical natural law, which, as had been learned from bitter experience, proved
inadequate to prevent legal positivism and the advent of authoritarianism. The
outcome was, as in all constitutional conventions, a compromise. Both the
philosophical and historical concepts of natural law found expression in the
Bonn constitution.
IV
THE PRESENCE of the older natural law in the Basic Law marks a decisive
change in the German legal tradition. It amounts to a renunciation of the
positivist dogma that the state is the source of all law. Through the insertion
20. Wiirttemberg-Baden, art. 39; Bavaria, art. 137; Hesse, art. 58; Rhineland-Palatinate,
art. 35; Baden, art. 28; Wfirttemberg-Hohenzollern, art. 115. In Bavaria and Rhineland-
Palatinate, the students may decide whether they want to participate in religious instruction,
at the age of eighteen. The constitutions of East Germany contain no provisions for reli-
gious instruction in the public schools. They provide only for the rights of the parents to
decide what religion their child should have. At the age of fourteen, this decision rests
with the child himself. (Thuringia, art. 79; Saxony-Anhalt, art. 95; Brandenburg, art. 68;
Mecklenburg, art. 92--here the age is fifteen).
21. Delegate Heuss warned that one should not consider natural law as something absolute
and that the new constitution should not be based on metaphysics. He and delegate Schmid
were opposed to an invocatio dei, which was, in their eyes, a strain upon religion. See Die
Entstehungsgeschichte der Artikel des Grtendgesetzes, I JAHRBUCH DES 6FFENTLICHEN
REcETs, NEUE FAsSUNG 30, 52.
22. See the statement of delegate Schmid, id. at 48. Delegate Suesterhenn was a leader
among those who were in favor of an orientation toward the older natural law. Id. at 29, 42.
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of the invocatio dei the constituent power no longer appears as sovereign.
Rather, it is bound by a code of ethics which has its roots in the will of God.
Likewise the legislature, as pouvoir constitu created by the pouvoir constitu-
ant, may do wrong. Therefore, its acts had to be subjected to a test as to
their compatibility with the constitution and natural law. For the exercise
of this reviewing function, a special court, the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), was established. 23 The democratic vogue is being
checked by the conservative robe.
Judicial review is new in Germany. As in most continental countries,
Montesquieu never had as great an impact upon Germany as did Rousseau.
Consequently, legislative supremacy was established in most German constitu-
tions that came into being between the French Revolution and Hitler's acces-
sion to power.24 In the Weimar Republic, it is true, certain steps toward
judicial review were taken. In the constitutional convention at Weimar,
Hugo Preuss stated that judicial review would prevail if not expressly for-
bidden.2 5 Heinrich Triepel strongly came forward in favor of judicial review,
with support from other jurists.26  The courts groped with the problem in
the years after the adoption of the constitution,27 and their efforts culminated
in the decision of the Reich Court (Reichsgericht) of November 4, 1925,
which recognized judicial review.28 Other courts followed suit.29
23. Basic Law, art. 92 et seq. For commentaries on these articles, see Gizsz, GRUNDOESETZ
FUR ma BUNDESR.EPUDLx DEUTSCHLAND (1949), and v. MANGOLDr, DAs BONNEI GauiD-
OzSETz (1953).
24. Only the constitutions of Bavaria (art. 72) and Prussia (art. 61, § 1) provided for
judicial review after the first world war. Thoma was right when in 43 AacHv FUR 6FFENT-
LICHzS RzcHT at 274 he said: "Nichtprftfung ist der bisher traditionelle, und - wer
m6chte es leugnen?-vom Standpunkt der Justiz betrachtet, durchaus befriedigende Zustand
gewesen. . . Nichtfiberprfifung ist das uns historisch Gegebene, ist deutsche, ja europ.iische
Tradition und durchaus causa favorabilis."
25. Verhandlungen des Verfassungsausschusses, 336 STiNOGRAPiscHE BERICHTE 483
et seq.
26. Triepel in STRETOKEiirrN ZWISCHEN REICH UND UNDERN, and in 39 ARCHrv FOR
1QFFENTLICHES tRZCHT 533. Those supporting Triepel were, to name a few, Buehler, Fleiner,
Fleischmann, Kaufmann, Nawiasky, Poetzsch, Schmitt, Stammler and Stier-Somlo. Among
the judges, Simons (President of the Reichsgericht).
27. RGSt. 56, 177; RGZ. 102, 164; KG. Nov. 26, 1920; KG. Nov. 1, 1921; Reichsfinanz-
hof, 5, 333 and 7, 97. A note may be permitted here that German decisions are quoted by
giving the name of the court, or its initials, first (RG. for Reichsgericht, KG. for Kammer-
gericht, OLG. for Oberlandesgericht, AG. for Amtsgericht, OVG. for Oberverwaltungsge-
richt etc.) and the date of the decision next. To the initials of the Reichsgericht are added
Z (for Zivilachen) which indicates a civil case, St (Strafsachen) which means criminal
cases. The decisions of the Reichsgericht and the Reichsfinanzhof are quoted by volume
and page, as above, or by date.
28. RGZ. 111, 320. For a discussion of that decision, see Carl J. Friedrich, The Issue of
Judicial Review in Germany 43 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 196-97 (1928).
29. Reichsfinanzhof Dec. 7, 1926 (32 DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNO 233); Bayerisches
Oberstes Landesgericht March 3, 1926 (31 DEUTSCHE JURISTENZErTUNO 903); OVG.
Hamburg Jan. 17, 1927 (56 JuisTiscE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1288).
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In spite of all these efforts, however, judicial review did noi become
generally accepted. The positivist tradition of the Empire, founded by jurists
like Gerber, Laband, and Georg Jellinek, had a firm grip upon the men of
the Weimar period. Gerhard Anschiitz, the leading commentator on the con-
stitution,3 0 expressed the prevalent opinion when he opposed judicial review.3 1
Calling attention to Art. 76, which provides that "the constitution may be
amended by process of legislation," Anschiitz concluded that "the constitution
and the statute are manifestations of the will of the very same power, the
legislative power." 32  Therefore, the Weimar constitution did not recognize
a distinction--so characteristic of the American system-between the amend-
ing and the ordinary legislative power. Consequently, Anschiitz reasoned,
there was no room for judicial review. A law that had come about in the
forms prescribed by the constitution had to be applied by the judge and
obeyed by the citizen, irrespective of its compatibility with "custom, morals,
good faith, natural law, justice, equity and reason." 33
This argument refuting judicial review had inescapable consequences.
The whole constitution was put at the disposition of the legislature, "irrespec-
tive of the content and the political consequences" of the legislative act.8 4 In
a similar manner, Hans Kelsen saw no limitations upon the legislature in the
exercise of its amending power.35 Legal positivism had been brought to an
extreme. Carl Schmitt's thesis on the restriction of the amending power
was a last warning.3 6 The crusade for freedom through a restriction of the
legislature came to an abrupt end with Hitler's accession to power. Weimar
had been the captive of the positivism of the Empire.3 7 The National Socialists
took over this heritage with open arms. They cunningly shifted legislative
30. DIE VERPASSUNO DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS, art. 70, nos. 2-5; art. 102, nos. 3-6 (4th
rev. ed. 1932). Anschiitz stresses that judicial review was also not permitted under the
Imperial constitution.
31. Others opposing judicial review were Arndt, Giese, Walter Jellinek, Thoma, Wittmaye.
For a survey of those opposed to judicial review, see Walter Jellinek, Das Marchen von der
Uberpriifung verfassungswidriger Reichsgesetze durch das Reichsgericht, 54 JUaRsrscHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 454.
32. Anschfitz, op. cit. supra note 30, art. 76, no. 1.
33. Id., art. 102, no. 4.
34. Id., art. 76, no. 3. Cf. RGZ. 118, 325.
35. KELSEN, ALLOEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 107.
36. VERFASSUNOSLEHE 11 et seq., 18 et seq., 102 et seq. (1928); see also BhLINoZa,
RECHSSPARKOMMiSSAAR 16-18; Triepel in 31 DEUTSCHE JuiusTzNzErrUNO 849. Para-
doxically Carl Schmitt, who came forward with his thesis at the time when he was support-
ing the Weimar Republic, later became a defender of the Hitler rigime. Hans Kelsen, on
the other hand, was one of its first victims.
37. Anschfitz, op. cit. supra note 30, art. 76, no. 3. Also Jeselsohn, Begriff, Arten und
Grenzen der Verfassungsinderung, Diss. Heidelberg, 1929, p. 67. For a different opinion,
see Bilfinger, Verfassungsrecht als politisches Recht, 18 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR POLITIK 228
(1929).
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power from the legislature to the executive in a manner legalized by the
letter of the constitution and used the positivism developed under the tradition
of the Rechstaat for the exercise of their rule of injustice. What originally
had been considered a Magna Charta for the protection of the individual had,
step by step, degenerated into a Magna Charta for the government's suppres-
sion of man.
Judicial review, a dead issue in the Third Reich, was after the war estab-
lished to a degree that was beyond the keenest hopes of its advocates in the
past decades. The acceptance of judicial review by the different states had
been so general and enthusiastic38 that the framers of the Basic Law, unlike
their predecessors at Weimar,39 decided to provide for it in the constitution.
Furthermore the judges, eager to prove their farewell to a positivism that,
under the Hitler r6gime, had discredited many and driven more to the verge
of professional suicide,40 took care that their new right was not just on paper.
Their exercise of judicial review was broad in scope. Not only were statutes
struck down for being unconstitutional, but also for being incompatible with
natural law. 41 To make things complete, even constitutional norms were
tested as to their compatibility with the constitution and natural law.42 And
this natural law was not only that of the age of reason, but that which derived
from the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition. The dream of Kohler had at last
come true, decades after this man's valiant fight against the rising tide of
positvism. 43
38. Constitutions of Wfirttemberg-Baden, art. 92; Bavaria, art. 65; Hesse, art. 131, 132;
Rhineland-Palatinate, art. 129, 130, 136; Baden, art. 114, Wfirttemberg-Hohenzollern, art. 65.
39. In the constitutional convention at Weimar, the attitude of the delegates was not de-
termined by their party affiliation. The delegates Ablass (Democratic Party), Kahl (German
People's Party), and Sinzheimer (Social-Democratic Party) were against, the delegates
Dueringer (German National Party), Katzenstein (Social-Democratic Party) and Preuss
(Democratic Party) for judicial review.
40. For the problem of the responsibility of the judges under an authoritarian rEgime, see
Coing, Zur Frage der Haftung der Richter fir die Anwendung naturrechtswidriger Gesetze;
Figge, Die Verantwortlichkeit des Richters; Becker, Der richterliche Widerstand, 1947 Si0t,-
DEUTSCHE JUiRISTENZErrUNO 61, 179, 480.
41. See the decisions of the AG. Wiesbaden of Nov. 13, 1945 (1946 StiDDEUTSCHE JUR-
ISTENZEITUNO 36); of the OLG. Freiburg of July 4, 1946 (1946 DEUTSCHE RECHTS-ZEIT-
SCHRIFT 93; of the OLG. Stuttgart of Sept. 4, 1946 (1946 SiIDDEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNO
236); of the KG. of Oct. 29, 1946 (1947 SODDEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNO 257).
42. See the decisions of the OVG. Lfineburg of March 16, 1950 (1950 DEUTSCHES VEa-
WALTUNOsBLATr 407); of the Bayerischer Verfassungsgerichtshof of April 24, 1950 (1950
VZRWALTUNOs-REcHTSPRECHUNO 237); of the Verfassungsgerichtshof of Wiirttemberg-
Baden of Nov. 13, 1950 (1950 DEUTSCHE RECHTS-ZEITSCHRIFT 566); of the Bundesverfas-
sungschrift of Oct. 23, 1951 (1951 NEuE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 877); of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht of Dec. 18, 1953 (1954 JURISTENZEITUNG 32). See, in this con-
nection, the author's Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms? in 42 VA. L. REv. 1 (1956).
43. KOHLE , LEHRBUCH DER RECHTSPH!LOSOPHiE 32 et seq., 43-44 (1923) contains
strong polemics against the secularization of natural law by Grotius. He wanted an orienta-
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V
JUST AS THEY refrain from recognizing the older natural law, the French
and Italian constitutions do not protect the individual from legislative oppres-
sion through judicial review. In the French constituent assembly, judicial
review was considered a conservative and undemocratic phenomenon. 'There
was, to be sure, created a Constitutional Committee (Comiti Constitutionnel),
which was to "determine whether the laws passed by the National Assembly
imply amendment of the constitution" (Art. 91). But its task was to bring
the constitution into harmony with the statute rather than to strike down
statutes because of their unconstitutionality. The fact that the Constitutional
Committee is stipulated in title XI also renders it liable to abolition by ordinary
statute without any possibility of raising the technical question of constitution-
ality by the ordinary procedure. As to the individual's basic rights, their
protection through the Committee is not possible, owing to the exclusion of the
provisions of the preamble from the competency of the Constitutional
Committee. 44
The constitution of Italy makes provision for judicial review through the
establishment of a Constitutional Court (Corte Costituzionale) (Art. 134-
137). However, in its function of protecting the individual from legislative
encroachments, it can hardly stand comparison with its German counterpart.
It judges "controversies concerning the constitutional legality of the laws...
of the state and the regions" (Art. 134). Its main function is to protect the
authority of the newly created regions and to test their laws, i.e., to secure the
unity of law in a regionalized nation. The right to review acts of the national
legislature is considered more or less incidental. At any rate, the Constitutional
Court is not likely to protect the individual from legislative acts, since under
the constitution the scope and definition of the individual's basic rights are
left to the discretion of the legislature. 45
tion of positive law toward the older natural law which he considered an absolute norm
which, however, could vary in the different societies and times. See also MODERNE RECHIT -
PROBLEME 1-15 (2d ed. 1913). Kohler's concept of natural law thus comes close to that
of Stammler, who believed in a natural law with a changing content. Dm LEHaz voM
RICHTIOEN RECHT 82 et seq. (2d ed. 1926).
44. The most comprehensive treatise on the problem of judicial review in postwar France
is JEANNE LEMASURIER, LA CONSTITUTION DE 1946 ET LE CONTRhLR JURIDICTIONNEL DU
LGISLATEUR (1954). Pp. 133-246 deal with the Constitutional Committee. This work also
contains a valuable bibliography. For other commentaries on the Constitutional Committee,
see GEORGES VEDEL, MANUEL tL-MENTAIRE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 551-56 (1949);
JULIEN LAFERRIi.RE, MANUEL DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 953-57 (2d ed. 1947); MAURICE
DUVEROER, MANUEL DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL iT DE SCIENCE PoLrrIQuE 376-78 (5th
ed. 1948); MARCEL PRELOT, PRtiS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 539-541 (1950).
45. For a discussion of judicial review in the constitutional assembly, see Atti dili' Aserm-
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In the French and Italian constitutions, then, the reaction against fascist
authoritarianism and its positivism, resulting in the suppression of the indi-
vidual, is reflected in the reinstitution of popular government according to
the principles of 1789. The will of society is considered sovereign and can
do no wrong. From the sovereignty of the pouvoir constituant there follows
a merely nominalistic recognition of natural law by that body: only what
is recognized by the pouvoir constituant as natural law is natural law! The
sovereignty of the constituent power is, in the constituent act, transferred to
the lawmaker. From this follows not only a subjectivist interpretation of
natural law by the legislator but also the denial of judicial review.
VI
WE MAY" THUS say that from among the constitutions coming out of the
European revolution of 1945, those drafted in West Germany may be con-
sidered the most "revolutionary' since they show a most unequivocal break
with a positivist past. Here the makers of the constitutions recognized some
objective natural law as their guiding principle,46 and, by transmuting it into
constitutional norms, had to subject the legislature-as nothing but a pouvoir
consitu---to these very norms. The institution of judicial review, considered
by many as the complement of an objective natural law, was adopted as the
blea Costituente (Seduta de 31 gennaio 1948), vol. XI, p. 4336. For a discussion of the
Court and judicial review, see CARmo Esposrro, LA COSTITUZIONZ ITALIANA 263-81 (1954);
RoBETo LucryRmn, LA NUovA CosTrruzioNa ITALIANA 197-205, 235-37 (1952).
46. For the possibility of objective values, see MAX SCHELER, DER FORMALISMUS IN DER
ETNM UND WIE MATERIALE WERTETHIK (Ist ed. 1916, 2d ed. 1921, 3d ed. 1927), and
NicoLmx HARTMANN, ETHIK (1926). In the foreword to the third edition of his great criti-
cism of Kant, Scheler takes issue with Hartmann's denial of a person-relation (Personrela-
tion) man-God. Scheler thus comes close to a theory of ethics and justice which is based upon
metaphysics and theology. Says he to Hartmann: "Wenn wir auch gelernt haben, uns urn
den 'objektiven Gehalt' der Werte zu kfimmern, so dfirfen wir-sollen wir nicht in einen den
lebendigen Geist erstarrenden Objektivismus und Ontologismus zurickfallen--das sittliche
Leben des Subjektes als Problem nicht vernachlissigen. Vberhaupt muss ich einen von
Wesen und mnglichem Vollzug lebendiger geistiger Akte ganz 'unabhingig' bestehen sollenden
Ideen-und Werthimmrel-'unabhingig' nicht nur von Mensch und menschlichem Bewusst-
scin, sondern von Wesen und Vollzug eines lebendigen Geistes fiberhaupt-prinzipiell schon
von der Schwelle der kPhilosophie zurfickweisen... Endlich kann ich auch die vollstindige
sachliche, nicht nur methodische Losreissung der ethischen Probleme von der Metaphysik
des Absoluten (Religionsphilosophie); der 'Person' vore Grunde aller Dinge, nicht billigen"
(pp. XIX-XX). The recognition of natural law as an absolute norm, possibly in the sense
of Kohler and Stammler, does not necessarily imply a total rejection of considerations of
utility. It is interesting to note, in this connection, certain passages of Thomas Aquinas'
Summa Theologica, according to which the function of law and justice lies in their utility:
I. II. qu. 95. a.3: "Finis autem humanae legis est utilitas hominum"; I. II. qu. 96. al:
"Finis autern legis est bonum commune"; I. I. qu. 97. a.l: "Rectitudo legis dicitur in
ordine ad utilitatem communem"; I. II. qu. 96. a.4: "Iniustae autem sunt legis dupliciter:
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most natural restriction upon the legislature. As distinguished from the French,
Italian, and East German constitutions, those of West Germany do not merely
check the evil of autocracy through the institution of popular government.
Framed under the impression of the shortcomings of the Weimar Republic,
they also prevent a resurgence of a legal positivism through proper restrictions
of popular power. They thus check the danger of a democratic despotism
and thereby go to the root of what may be considered the evil of our century.
This evil seems to be identical with what may easily become the evil of
democracy, namely, sheer majority rule. Jacob Burckhardt shared Ranke's
doubts as to the value of the sovereignty of the people.47 The French Revolu-
tion, which "considered itself the symbol of freedom," appeared to him "as
fundamentally unfree as a forest fire." 48  "The decisive innovation that
was brought- about by the French Revolution," he said, "is the authority
and the desire to change matters, for the public weal."'4  He, like many
of his contemporaries, 50 saw the reason for the fin de si9cle in the increasing
power of the volonti ginlrale. These warnings, sounded in the last century,
were quelled in the coming revolution of the masses until, in the end, the
individual was eliminated in the mass movement of fascism. The failure to
recognize the fact that unlimited democracy had made possible the rise of
modern dictatorship caused in France and Italy the omission of constitutional
provisions providing for checks upon the majority.
Thus the European nations, through their different concepts of democracy,
demonstrate the eternal dilemma of popular government, which is one of
the degree to which majority rule should be permitted. It was a great fortune
for the United States that its democratic revolution was concluded in the
uno modo per contrariatem ad bonum hominum.. ex fine, sicut cum aliquis praesidens
leges imponit onorosas subditis, non pertinentes ad utilitatem communem, sed magis ad
propriam cupiditatem vel gloriam"; I. II. qu. 97. a.2: "Lex humana intantum recte mutatur,
inquantum per eius mutationem communi utilitati providetur"; WII. II. qu. 78. al: "Leges
humanae dimittunt alique peccata impunita propter conditiones hominum imperfectorum, in
quibus multae utilitates impedirentur, si omnia peccata prohiberentur poenis adhibitis." The
proiestant Rudolf v. Jhering had, 5n view of the writings of Thomas, to admit in a note (,f
the second edition of DER ZWECK iM RECHT (1916) at 126: "Staunend frage ich mich, wie
war es moglich, dass solche Wahrheiten, nachdem sic einmal ausgesprochen waren, bei unserer
protestantischen Wissenschaft so ginzlich in Vergessenheit geraten konnten? Welche Irr-
wege hitte sie sich ersparen konnen, wenn sic dieselben beherzigt hritte! Ich meinerseits
hitte vielleicht mein ganzes Buch nicht geschrieben, wean ich sic gekannt hitte, dean die
Grundgedanken, um die es mir zu tun war, finden sich schon bei jenem gewaltigen Denker in
vollendeter Klarheit und prignantester Form ausgesprochen."
47. WELTOESCHICHTLICHE BETRACHTUNOEN 132 (Kroener ed.). He refers to the idea of
popular sovereignty as the "ferment of the modern world."
48. WELTOESCHICHTLICHE BETRACHTUNoEN 279 (Kaegi ed. 1941).
49. -HsToRIscHE FRAGMENTS 205 (1942).
50. Stendhal, Niebuhr, Kierkegaard, to name only a few.
NATURAL LAW FORUM
short period from 1776 to 1789. The Founding Fathers were aware of the
fact that "in our opposition to monarchy, we forgot that the temple of tyranny
has two doors. We bolted one of them by proper restraints; but we left the
other open, by neglecting to guard against the effects of our own ignorance
and licentiousness."5 1  The Federal Convention checked the excesses of
democracy and preserved free government. Europe, ten years after the defeat
of fascism, is still in the throes of its democratic revolution. In Germany,
the danger of a democratic legal positivism seems, for the time being, banned.
The situation is different in France and Italy. Possibly, caution was not as
necessary here. Although legal positivism existed in the Western countries
before it was introduced in Germany,52 its dangers were early perceived and
thus natural law never quite disappeared in those countries.68 Nevertheless,
there exists a present danger of democratic despotism which, since it is not
clear to many, must be pointed out.4
Georg Jellinek, the positivist, once said that law is an ethical minimum. 55
Since it is an ethical minimum, it should be derived from some superior,
objective ethical norm, which exists irrespective of its recognition by man.
For the sake of the individual's freedom, this norm would then be the guide
for a democratic as much as for an autocratic pouvoir constituant. It was
51. Benjamin Rush in his Address to the people of the United States of 1787, in HxzZZAR
NILES, PRNCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE REVOLUTION 402 (1822).
52. Two generations before positivism reached its climax in Germany, the French jurist
Bugnet made the statement that for him there existed no civil law, but only a civil code:
"Je ne connais pas de droit civil; je n'enseigne que le Code Napoleon." Quoted in J.
BONNECASE, ACOLE DR L'EXEOkSE EN DRorr CIVIL 128 (2d ed. 1924). The development in
France, characterized by a positivistic transformation of the law into a legality that is based
on statute, was, in the first half of the nineteenth century, considered the very essence of the
progress of civilization and humanity. Great representatives of the so-called "icole de
l'ex6gse" were Carre de Malberg, G. J ze, M. Waline, G. Ripert, V. J. Basdevant. As to
Germany, KXchmrann's address Die Werthlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft was
made in 1847. Windscheid, in his university address at Greifswald, stated in 1854 that the
dream of natural law was over. However, juristic positivism reached its climax in Germany
only after the foundation of the Empire in 1871. Its main representatives in public law
were Gerber, Laband, Georg Jellinek, Hans Kelsen.
53. See LAmENNAIS, PROGRkS DE LA RiVOLUTION ET DE LA GUERRE CONTRE L'9.LtSE
(1829), and the writings of de Tocqueville. As late as 1916 the eminent French jurist Maur-
ice Hauriou made the statement: "Or, l R6volution de 1789, ce n'est pas autre chose que
l'avinement absolu de la loi krite et la destruction systimatique des institutions coutumihes.
Il en est rksult6 un 6tat perpAtuellement revolutionnaire, parce que la mobiliti de la loi 6crite
n'ftant plus iquilibrie par )a stabilit de certaines institutions coutumi&es, les forces de
changement se sont trouvies plus puissantes que les forces de stabiliti. En France, la vie
sociale et politique, absolument vid~e d'institutions, n'a pu se maintenir provisoirement, avec
bien des soubresauts, que grace au niveau 6levi de la moralit6 gn~rale." (PRINCPES DR
D~orr PmuLnc XI).
54. The danger is clearly recognized by Louis Rougier in his LA FRANCE 1 LA RECHERCHE
D'UNE CONSTITUTION (1952).
55. DIz SOZIALETHISCHE BEDEUTUNO VON RECHT, UNRECET UND STRAFE 45 (2d ed. 1908).
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considered as such by the fathers of some of the modem European
constitutions.
The revival of the older natural law signals a new beginning on the
continent. It ties in with the European spirit that is so characteristic of the
revolution of 1945 and of the constitutions framed in its wake.56 Historical
natural law, mainly oriented toward popular sovereignty, facilitated national-
ism rather than the European idea. The older natural law, on the other hand,
could reassume its historical r6le and bring about a ius publicum Europaeum
as a step toward the political unity of a continent that is representative of
Western civilization.
56. Compare the preamble of the French constitution, article 11 of the Italian constitution,
and the preamble of the Basic Law.
